Industrial Embedded Systems - Design for Harsh Environment -

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
Part IV

WS 2011/12

Technical University Munich (TUM)

Case Study

An electronics component that measures pressure in an industrial environment is to be developed. It connects to our series of 4-20 mA pressure sensors, does a temperature compensation, and communicates the value via a CAN interface. We are part of the development team that designs this component (ME, EE, CS). The component is referred to as PMU (Pressure Measurment Unit).



PMU Requirements Analysis


- Material cost < \$50
- Power consumption < 2 W
- Physical size 50 x 25 x 10 mm
- Standard/Certification: IEC61508 SIL3 in 1002
- Operating temperature -40 °C to +85 °C
- PIC uC preferred
- Application area: process industry (O&G, power plants, ...)

PMU Requirements Analysis II

- Certainly the requirements are not sufficient. According to the last lectures we develop the following approach
 - See if we need a feasibility study
 - Look at reliability. Can we improve our present solution (if any)?
 Does the result influence our system architecture?
 - Is there a safety aspect? Does the result influence our system architecture?
 - We need to answer ourselves the questions on functional (what?) and non-functional (how well?) requirements.
 - We write down our findings in technical terms (requirements specification) following the outline given in the last lecture.
- In addition we use all internal guidelines and templates (which will be different from business to business)

PMU Reliability

- First we look into a simplex system according to the high level description we have received internally
- We assume reliability metrics from experience or literature.
- We still work at the system border.



MTBF_Power = 2a MTBF_Pressure = 50a MTBF_Temp=50a MTBF_Control=150a MTBF_CAN=20a

$$\Theta_S = 1.68a$$



PMU Reliability II

- Obviously, power is the system component having the lowest MTBF (2a).
- The function of power is to deliver power to the PMU electronics.
- Power is made of
 - Connectors (mechanics, electronics)
 - Filters, capacitors
 - Step-down converters (do not know exactly what voltage levels at that point) – probably +5V, -5V, +3.3V
- Can we improve power (better MTBF)?
- Does this improvement affect the requirements specification or is it rather a matter of more detailed design?

PMU Reliability III


Function	Failure	Effekt	Si	Cause	Oi	Di	RPNi
power	external 24V power connection	Total power loss	8	cable breaks	7	5	280
				insufficient mating	5	5	200
	input protection	Total power loss	8	faulty passive components	3	5	120
		power quality loss	7	faulty passive components	2	5	70
	output conversion	partial power loss	8	faulty power conversion electronics	3	5	120

- Function, failure, effect, Si (severity), cause, Oi (occurrence),
 Di (detectability) to be filled in -> Risk Priority Number
- Now we think about how we can mitigate the effects with respect to the system level
- An obvious approach here would be to use a second independently routed power cable.

PMU Reliability IV


- FTA is another way of analyzing the systems.
- Gives us the root cause of a failure.
- Cable failure is further analyzed asking "Why?".

FTA more powerful when analysis of combinations are necessary.



loss

PMU Reliability VI




 $\Theta_S = 6.1195a$ in new configuration -> a second power connector is added. It increases the MTBF (details are not clear at this point).

Safety

- Safety is a system approach. The safety function and its safety integrity is critical on the super-system level (a process industry application in this case).
- Requirements on safety integrity are based on a risk analysis (last lecture).
- Safety integrity requirements can also be based on market analysis.
- For the PMU our marketing organization communicated:
 - SIL3 in a 1002 configuration (duplex) the competitor probably has some similar quality metric in the data sheet

System Safety FTA



A. Walsch, IN2244 WS 2012/13

PMU Safety Function

 Wrong pressure readings can lead to hazardous states and possibly to harm at the super-system level.

Imagine:

- Over pressure in vessels (chemical industry), oil and gas pipelines, or wells in oil and gas exploration
- Pressure readings must be correct (normal function) and faults at the PMU level (external or internal) need to be detected and communicated.
- Therefore, the safety function can simply be phrased like: "The PMU shall communicate a temperature compensated pressure reading".
 - The message indicating a violation signals the "safe state". This can be used in a fail-safe or a fail-operational approach.


Safety Function Integrity

- From marketing we know that the SIL of the PMU shall be 3 in a 1002 configuration.
- We need to understand now what effort that means in terms of developing the hardware and software for this system.
- Looking back a lecture we came across this:
 - high and low demand of safety function and the failure table
 - Architecture and SIL ratings

SIL	High demand	Low demand
4	$10^{-9} \le PFH \le 10^{-8}$	$10^{-5} \le PFD \le 10^{-4}$
3	$10^{-8} \le PFH \le 10^{-7}$	$10^{-4} \le PFD \le 10^{-3}$
2	$10^{-7} \le PFH \le 10^{-6}$	$10^{-3} \le PFD \le 10^{-2}$
1	$10^{-6} \le PFH \le 10^{-5}$	$10^{-2} \le PFD \le 10^{-1}$


Source:

IEC61508



Safety Function Integrity II

 From marketing we know that the SIL of the PMU shall be 3 in a 1002 configuration. A system configuration might look like this:





Safety Function Integrity Modelling

- Both channels need to fail dangerously in order to enter a hazardous super-system state.
- Reliability of the safety function in a 1002 configuration:

 $R_{1002} = 2R_{simplex} - R_{simplex}^2 > R_{simplex}$; $R_{simplex}$ being the reliability


based on dangerous failures in a simplex configuration





Requirements for Single Channel

- So far only random hardware failures (constant failure rate) have been considered.
- Systematic failures, especially software, have not been considered.
- Reliability of the safety function can be increased by adding redundancy (from SIL2 to SIL3).
- How can we include software errors into our model? We can not but we can visualize the big picture by adding common cause failures to the safety integrity assessment.




Requirements for Single Channel II

- A 1001D architecture for a single channel would meet the SIL2 requirement.
 - uC + additional diagnostic circuit
- SIL3 for software is required.
- SFF = 90% < 99%
- Process safety time: the deadline on reporting internal or external faults to prevent hazardous states (application specific)

PMU Availability

- Availability of 1002 (lecture #2):


 In normal operation a precise and accurate pressure measurement is required
 (measure pressure functional requirement)
 - (measure pressure = functional requirement) (precise, accurate = non-functional requirement)
- A PMU can fail safe or dangerously. In both cases two different readings will be provided to the upper level control system. Which one is the correct one?
- The system will enter a fail-safe mode meaning the safety function is not performed anymore.



PMU Availability II

 Both channels have to deliver a valid result (no detected faults, within limits) in normal operation.

$$R_{1002} = R^2$$
 -> availability decreases (function of reliability)






PMU – Functional Requirements Analysis

- Use case diagram
- Behaviorally related sequences performed by an actor.

Actors = external users, Temperature Sensor systems, components

system border

 View on the ideal world, deal with deviations from expected behavior later



PMU – Functional Requirements Analysis II

- Pre-conditions and post-conditions are the states of the system before and after successful execution of the use case. These can often be cross-referenced to the states in the system modes diagram.
- Non-functional requirements (see previous lecture)
- Alternate courses are a selection of alternative courses (fault conditions) and scenarios can be listed.
- Example screen layouts are illustrations of screens associated with the use case, including sample user data where available.
- Ties exceptions (faults, errors) and non-functional requirements to a use case

PMU – Functional Requirements Analysis III

Measure Pressure:

	A request is received from the CAN bus. A temperature	
Description	compensated pressure reading is sent as response.	
Pre-condition	The system must be in 'Running' state.	
Post-condition	The system will be in 'Running' state.	
	Pressure is read with a maximum cycle time of 100ms,	
Non-functional Requirements	output accuracy is 2%, precision is 0.5%.	
	Pressure outputs are in a range equivalent 0 - 16 bar. The	
	valid temperature ranges from -45°C to +85°C. If either range	
Alternate Courses	is violated it must be signalled via CAN.	

Configure System:

	A request for configuration is communicated to the system.
	The requester is a technician which is equivalent to
	someone with restricted access rights. During configuration
	the system is not accepting CAN requests. The system
Description	reports valid configuration.
Pre-condition	The system must be in 'Active' state.
Post-condition	The system will be in 'Active' state.
	Access should be protected by a password. The
Non-functional Requirements	configuration data shall be stored in non-volatile memory.
	All configuration options are checked for validity. If the
	configuration data are not valid the system signals the 'Error'
Alternate Courses	state.

PMU – Functional Requirements Analysis IV

Display Health:

	Health of the system is requested by a user. The system displays health using LEDs. Three LEDs are used. Green for 'Running', Red for 'Error', and yellow for all other system states. The LEDs are visible from outside the system such
Description	that the user gets visual feedback.
Pre-condition	The system must be in 'Active' state.
Post-condition	NA
Non-functional Requirements	NA
Alternate Courses	NA

Start System:

	Power is applied and the system starts. The system	
	performs a self test. Upon successful completion the system	
Description	automatically enters the 'Running' state.	
Pre-condition	The system must be in 'Inactive' state	
Post-condition	The system will be in 'Active' state	
Non-functional Requirements	The system shall be in 'Running' state in less than 10s.	
	If the system detetcts a fault the 'Error' state shall be	
	entered. In this case the system shall report the error state	
Alternate Courses	in less than 10s.	

PMU – Functional Requirements Analysis V

Stop System:

Description	Power is removed.
Pre-condition	The system must be in 'Active' state.
Post-condition	The system will be in 'Inactive'state.
Non-functional Requirements	NA
Alternate Courses	NA

Summary:

- Identify the actors: external to the system
- Identify the use cases:
 - "A behaviorally related sequence of interactions performed by an actor in a dialogue with the system to provide some measurable value to the actor"
- Create a use case diagram
- Write up use case descriptions
- The graphical notation does not add any information but makes talking to stakeholders sometimes easier

PMU – Functional Requirements Analysis VI


System Usage Modeling Checklist

- Scale:
 A manageable number of use cases should be selected 10 to 20
- Granularity
 Use cases should be not too high level (e.g. run system) or too low level (too many details)
- Relevance
 Use cases should display normal actor-system interaction. Fault conditions should be part of more detailed analysis (e.g. in alternate courses)
- Partitioning
 Use cases describe end-to-end functionality and not generic functions of (to be developed sub-systems)
- Applicability
 Use case diagrams describe the response to external stimuli. Therefore, they are suited to describe real-time systems on a high level.

PMU – Functional Requirements Analysis VII

- System Usage Diagram does not tell us:
 - Internal Structure:
 What are the components of the systems that interact with the actors (mechanical, electrical, software), is there a component that controls activity?
 - Interface Description:
 Interfaces are modeled as "classes". A class name can already be used as a description (e.g. I²C bus)
- But the composite structure diagram does
 - Also focuses on the system border, very high-level structural model
 - Shows what is inside and outside our system

PMU - Scope




PMU – Scope II

Content of Requirements Specification

- Context structure diagram as in previous slide: shows what is inside and outside the systems responsibility, nature of interfaces:
- Pressure sensor: 4 20 mA, screw terminal, sensor powered externally or by PMU
- Temperature sensor: PT100 three wire, screw terminal
- Power: screw terminal
- CAN: D-sub 9
- Health: LEDs
- Config: RS232 D-sub 9 (PC interface)
- Interface description can be added to context structure but can also be added as text in the specification

PMU – System States



PMU – System States II

- System states: states of the system when viewed as a black box
 - States of the PMU control object
 - States allow or disallow certain use cases
 - State transitions often triggered by actor interaction (see scope in previous slides)
 - Where use cases are shown as actions, it is important to recognize that the action implied is the initiation of the use case, not necessarily its completion.

PMU Requirements Specification



System Requirements Specification

for

Pressure Measurement Unit (PMU)

Preliminary Information